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Lo¨ıc He´loue¨t and Aline Roumy
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loic.helouet@irisa.fr,aline.roumy@irisa.fr
Since the seminal paper by Goguen & Messeguer in 1982 [1], it is frequently
written that cover channels are a speciﬁc case of interference. Let us recall the
deﬁnition of both notions. We consider a system S, in which several agents
are allowed to perform actions. In addition to the system, several security rules
indicate which (sequences of) actions should remain unobservable (secret), which
users are allowed to communicate (conﬁnement), etc. An user u interferes with
an user v in a system S if and only if what u does can aﬀect what v can observe or
do. Interference then characterizes information leaks, as through its observations,
user v can learn what user u does.
The term covert channel was introduced by [3]. We say that there is a covert
channel from an user u to another user v (which are not allowed to communicate
otherwise) of a system S if and only if user u can transmit a message of arbitrary
size to v through its use of S.
Though both deﬁnitions seem very close, there are some major diﬀerences.
First of all, an interference can occur from an user u to an user v even when
u is an honest agent of the system, while covert channels suppose an a priori
agreement of a pair of dishonest agents to establish a communication. That is, if
agent u can play several actions to signal a bit of information to v, it will choose
the best strategy so that v receives this bit. Another diﬀerence is that leaking
once some information is suﬃcient to be interferent. If user u plays an action a
that is observed later on by agent v, then this situation is called an interference,
even if this is the only leak in any run of artbitrary size. On the other side, covert
channels suppose that any message of arbitrary size can be transferred from
user u to user v. This supposes an iterated behavior, in which each iteration of
channel’s use allows to pass some bits of information from one user to another.
Even with these diﬀerences, it may seem that systems containing covert chan-
nels from u to v are necessarily interferent, in a way or another. We will however
show that both notions are orthogonal issues, as interference occurs as soon
as actions of u and observations of v “coincide” (which is not necessarily a covert
channel), and as a covert ﬂow exists as soon as u and v have a strategy to iterate
information passing (which is not always an interference).
Information theoretic frameworks have been proposed by Millen [4] for in-
terference, and recently for covert channel [2]. Interference is characterized by a
non-null mutual information between u’s actions and v’s observations and covert
ﬂows as a non-null average maximal mutual information between u’s actions and
v’s observations (i.e it is a channel capacity). We will show that even in these
very generic frameworks, interference and covert ﬂows remain orhtogonal issues.
Last, we will discuss how covert channels can be seen as games, where a pair
of players u, v wins against the system if it succeeds in maximizing the average
covert information from u to v in inﬁnite runs. Finding the best possible strategy
(i.e. the strategy that maximizes the ﬂow of information) is still an open issue
in the ﬁeld of numerical communications.
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